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“I’LL KNOW IT WHEN I SEE IT”: DEFENDING THE
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU’S
APPROACH OF INTERPRETING THE SCOPE OF UNFAIR,
DECEPTIVE, OR ABUSIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES
(“UDAAP”) THROUGH ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Stephen J. Canzona †

INTRODUCTION
The U.S. financial crisis of 2007–2009 exposed the tragic consequences that can
occur when vulnerable consumers fall prey to onerous or egregious terms contained
in financial services contracts. 1 This vulnerability was particularly apparent in the
U.S. housing market, where a combination of factors—including deceptive marketing terms, imprudent mortgage loan underwriting, and lack of borrower awareness
and education—contributed to a housing “bubble” that ultimately burst, resulting in
billions of dollars in losses in mortgages and mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”).2
When the dust finally settled, consumers lost a staggering $17 trillion in household
net wealth between 2007 and the first quarter of 2009, and 26.2 million Americans
remained unemployed as of November 2010. 3
Congress created the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (“FCIC”) to examine
the causes of the recent financial crisis, including fraud and abuse in the financial
sector. 4 The FCIC identified “widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision,” noting that regulators often “lacked the political will. . . as well as the fortitude to critically challenge the institutions and the entire system they were entrusted
to oversee.” 5 Indeed, Vincent Reinhart, a former Director of the Federal Reserve
Board (“FRB”)’s Division of Monetary Affairs conceded that “he and other regula-

† J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2019; B.S., Georgetown University, 2007. I would like to
thank Professor Judy Fox for her support and guidance throughout the writing process, and the members of the
Notre Dame Journal of Legislation for their diligent editing. Most of all, I would like to thank my family and
friends for their constant love and encouragement. All errors are my own.
1 See Eric M. Aberg, Note, The Case for UDAAP-Based Credit Card Lending Regulations: Providing
Greater Financial Security for America and American Consumers, 84. GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1029 (2016).
2 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL INQUIRY REPORT, xvi, 6-7 (2011)
[hereinafter FCIC REPORT], available at http:www.fcic.gov/report/ (noting that the pro-

liferation of these products had the effect of “confounding consumers who didn’t examine
the fine print, baffling conscientious borrowers who tried to puzzle out their implications,
and opening the door for those who wanted in on the action.”).
3 Id. at 391-392.
4 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-21 (2009).
5 FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at xviii.
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tors failed to appreciate the complexity of the new financial instruments and the difficulties that complexity posed in assessing risk.” 6
Cognizant of the shortcomings in the existing regulatory framework for consumer financial products, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) 7 in 2010. Significantly, the DoddFrank Act created a new independent federal agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB” or “Bureau”) to “regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial products or services under the Federal consumer financial laws.” 8
The CFPB has supervisory authority over banks and credit unions with assets over
$10 billion, as well as certain nonbank financial companies. 9 Pursuant to the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (“CFPA”), 10 the CFPB also has the power to
investigate and bring enforcement actions against supervised entities involving allegations of so-called “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices” (“UDAAP”
claims). 11 Commentators were quick to point out that federal regulators have policed
unfair or deceptive acts or practices (“UDAP”) for decades. So, what’s the source of
the most recent controversy? Like many federal statutes, the devil lies in the details
of the CFPA. In particular, UDAAP’s newest term—“abusive”—has generated considerable debate. The CFPB has indicated that “the legal standards for abusive, unfair, and deceptive each are separate,” 12 but some critics have charged that the Bureau
has failed to provide adequate guidance concerning what constitutes a statutorily prohibited “abusive” act or practice. 13 In spite of this criticism, the Bureau has made it
clear that it will still bring enforcement actions against supervised entities if it believes their actions violated the plain language of the CFPA, even in the absence of
formal rulemaking or other agency guidance. 14
This Note weighs in on the current debate and argues that the CFPB’s practice
of interpreting UDAAP standards through enforcement actions strikes the proper balance between safeguarding the interests of consumers and responsible providers of
financial services. Part I of this Note provides a brief history of UDAAP statutes as
6 FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 45.
7 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203 (2010).
8 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2012).
9 See CFPB FACTSHEET – ENFORCING FEDERAL CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 1-2 (2016), available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/07132016_cfpb_SEFL_anniversary_factsheet.pdf (noting that
“nonbanks include mortgage lenders and servicers, payday lenders, and private student lenders of all sizes, as
well as larger participants in the debt collection, consumer reporting, auto finance, student loan servicing, and
international money transmission markets.”).
10 Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. X, 124 Stat. 1955 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5481–5603
(2012)).
11 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2012).
12 CFPB, SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL (2017), at UDAAP 9 (hereinafter “Aug. 2017
CFPB MANUAL”).
13 See Martin J. Bishop, The CFPB’s Powers Continue to Expand; UDAAP is Still a Potential Black
Hole For Consumer Financial Services Companies, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT 4 (2012), available
at https://www.foley.com/files/Publication/2c47b9d8-2cdb-4989-a556-11966f4e201c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e1c7cb83-7a96-4f5b-8c18-5d58dc6631af/Bishop%20Thomson%20Reuters%203%2015%2012.pdf.
14 See John Villa & Ryan Scarborough, The Law of Unintended Consequences: How the CFPB’s Unprecedented Legislative Authority and Enforcement Approach Has Invited Increasing Challenges, BANKING &
FIN. SERVS. POLICY REPORT 3 (July 2016).

62

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 45:3]

a mechanism for government enforcement and explains the rationale for expanding
the reach of UDAP to prohibit abusive conduct. Part II examines selected judicial
and legislative challenges to the CFPB’s UDAAP enforcement authority and assesses
why they have largely fallen short of their intended goals. Part III outlines a case for
upholding the CFPB’s existing approach, arguing that the CFPB’s enforcement actions and compliance bulletins issued to date provide financial industry participants
with ample precedent of what constitutes unfair, deceptive, and abusive conduct and
do not present substantive due process concerns.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE UDAAP DOCTRINE

Unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices (“UDAAPs”) are direct descendants of their unfair or deceptive acts or practices (“UDAP”) ancestors. Historically,
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has had the power to prevent nonbank entities from using “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” under
§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”). 15 Similarly, U.S. banking regulators had the authority to enforce § 5 for the banking entities they supervised. 16
The Dodd-Frank Act transferred rulemaking and enforcement authority over consumer financial products from these banking regulators to the CFPB with respect to
insured depository institutions or credit unions with total assets of $10 billion or
greater (so-called “too-big-to-fail” banks). 17 After Dodd-Frank, prudential banking
regulators retained this authority with respect to insured depository institutions or
credit unions with less than $10 billion in total assets.18 Similarly, the FTC retained
its authority to “enforce those rules and to continue defining acts or practices that are
unfair or deceptive with regards to non-depository institutions.” 19 The Dodd-Frank
Act further requires the CFPB and FTC to coordinate their efforts with respect to
enforcement actions “regarding the offering or provision of consumer financial products or services.” 20
States have crafted their own consumer protection laws based on a handful of
15 See Laurie A. Lucas, Adam D. Maarec & John C. Morton, “Abusive” Acts or Practices Under the
CFPA’s UDAAP Prohibition, 71 BUS. LAW. 749 (2016) (citing the Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a), 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012)).
16 See FED. DEP. INS. CORP., FDIC COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL, SECTION VII: ABUSIVE
PRACTICES (2015) at VII-1.1 (“hereinafter NOV. 2015 FDIC MANUAL”) (identifying these banking regulators
as: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the FRB, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(“OCC”) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTC”), and noting these agencies may coordinate UDAP enforcement activity if a UDAP involves an entity or entities over which more than one agency has enforcement
authority).
17 See 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b) (2012) (transferring consumer protection functions from the enumerated
agencies to the CFPB).
18 12 U.S.C. § 5516 (2012).
19 Norman I. Silber, Reasonable Behavior at the CFPB, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 87, 101 n.77
(2012). See also 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b)(5)(C)(ii) (2012) (clarifying that “the Federal Trade Commission shall
have authority to enforce under the Federal Trade Commission Act . . . a rule prescribed by the Bureau under
this title with respect to a covered person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission under that
Act, and a violation of such a rule by such a person shall be treated as a violation of a rule issued under section
18 of that Act . . . with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”).
20 12 U.S.C. § 5514 (2012). See also FTC & CFPB, Memorandum of Understanding between the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Federal Trade Commission
(2012),
http://ftc.gov/os/2012/01/120123ftc-cfpb -mou.pdf.
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model acts (including the FTC Act). 21 State Attorneys General (“State AGs”) often
bring similar lawsuits alleging UDAP-based violations pursuant to their authority to
act in the public interest and enforce state laws. 22 Alternatively, individual consumers acting as “private AGs” may initiate their own lawsuits alleging violations of state
UDAP laws, subject to certain restrictions. 23 In April 2011, the CFPB and the Presidential Initiative Working Group of the National Association of Attorneys General
(“NAAG”) announced a Joint Statement of Principles to better coordinate law enforcement practices between federal and state officials in the consumer financial services arena. 24
In discussing the principles underlying “unfair” and “deceptive” practices, the
CFPB has noted that “[t]he Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and federal banking
regulators have applied these standards through case law, official policy statements,
guidance, examination procedures, and enforcement actions that may inform
CFPB.” 25 In this vein, the Bureau has largely adopted the FTC’s definitions of these
terms. 26
1. The “Unfairness” Standard
The FTC has indicated that an act or practice is “unfair” when it: “(1) causes or
is likely to cause substantial injury (usually monetary) to consumers, (2) cannot be
reasonably avoided by consumers, and (3) is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.” 27 A “substantial injury” can take the form of
either monetary or reputational harm. 28 In addition, consumers need only take reasonable steps to avoid injury—for example, they would not need to hire independent
experts to test consumer products in advance. 29 Examples of acts or practices where
a consumer could not reasonably avoid injury include: (1) if material information
about a product, such as pricing, was missing or withheld from the consumer until
after the consumer had committed to purchasing the product; (2) product disclosures
that inadequately explained the terms of the act or practice to the consumer; or (3)
where a consumer was coerced into purchasing unwanted products or services.30

21 NAT’L POLICY & LEGAL ANALYSIS NETWORK, CONSUMER PROTECTION: AN OVERVIEW OF STATE
LAWS AND ENFORCEMENT 1 (2010), available at http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/phlc-fs-agconsumer-2010.pdf.
22 Id.
23 See id. at 1–2 (noting that “private lawsuits may not be able to obtain the full range of remedies
available to state AGs” and that “the law may impose additional evidentiary burdens on consumers, such as
requiring them to prove that they relied on the specific practice they are suing over, or that the defendant’s
conduct affects the public at large.”).
24 Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and National Association of Attorneys General
Presidential Initiative Working Group Release Joint Statement of Principles, CFPB (Apr. 11, 2011),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-and-national-association-of-attorneys-general-presidential-initiative-working-group-release-joint-statement-of-principles/
25 AUG. 2017 CFPB MANUAL, supra note 12, at UDAAP 1.
26 Id. at UDAAP-1-8.
27 NOV. 2015 FDIC MANUAL, supra note 16, at VII-1.2.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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This assessment is generally made from an ex ante perspective. 31 In other words, so
long as institutions do not create unreasonable obstacles for consumers to make informed decisions about their products, government regulators will generally not “second guess” whether a consumer could have made a wiser decision after the fact.32
Public policy considerations are also contemplated within this framework, though
they do not serve as a primary basis for determining that an act or practice is unfair.33
Regulators argue that the public at large is harmed by unfair acts or practices because
consumers are steered into products that they otherwise would not have purchased.34
In addition, preventing unfair acts or practices creates a more level playing field for
businesses because responsible providers of products and services no longer have to
compete with less scrupulous merchants. 35
2. The “Deceptive” Standard
The FTC developed a separate three-part test to determine whether a representation, omission, or practice is “deceptive”: “First, the representation, omission, or
practice must mislead or be likely to mislead the consumer. Second, the consumer’s
interpretation of the representation, omission, or practice must be reasonable under
the circumstances. Third, the misleading representation, omission, or practice must
be material.” 36 Unlike the standards for establishing unfairness, there is no requirement that a consumer take reasonable steps to avoid the injury or that the magnitude
of the injury be weighed against countervailing public policy considerations. 37 In
addition, misleading representations “may be in the form of express or implied claims
or promises and may be written or oral.” 38 An omission may be considered deceptive
if disclosure would be necessary to prevent a consumer from being misled. 39 Further,
representations and omissions are evaluated in the context of the entire advertisement, transaction, or course of dealing—rather than in isolation—to determine
whether they are misleading. 40 The determination of whether an act or practice is
misleading is evaluated from the perspective of the “reasonable consumer,” which is
an objective standard based on how a reasonable member of the target audience for
that product would interpret the marketing material. 41 For example, disclosures buried in the fine print of a consumer contract are “generally insufficient to cure a misleading headline or prominent written representation.” 42 Finally, the materiality of a
representation, omission, or practice is assessed on the basis of whether “it is likely
31 Id.
32 Id..
33 Id. at VII-1.3.
34 Id.
35 Id. at VII-1.2–1.3.
36 Id. at VII-1.3.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at VII-1.3–1.4. See also id. at VII-1.4 n.9 (noting that “[w]hen evaluating the three-part test for
deception, the four ‘Ps’ should be considered: prominence, presentation, placement, and proximity.”).
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to affect a consumer’s decision to purchase or use a product or service” (emphasis
added). 43 An intent to deceive is not a required element of proving that an act or
practice is deceptive. 44 Rather, if it can be shown that the institution “intended that
the consumer draw certain conclusions based upon the claim,” materiality will be
presumed (emphasis added). 45 Examples of acts or practices that have the potential
to be deceptive include:
[1] making misleading cost or price claims; [2] using bait-and-switch techniques; [3] offering to provide a product or service that is not in fact available; [4] omitting material limitations or conditions from an offer; [5] selling a product unfit for the purposes for which it is sold; and [6] failing to
provide promised services. 46
3. The “Abusive” Standard
Turning to the newest “A” in UDAAP, the CFPA defines an “abusive” act or
practice as one that:
(1) Materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or
condition of a consumer financial product or service; or
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of (A) a lack of understanding on the part of
the consumer of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service; (B) the inability of the consumer to protect its interests in selecting or
using a consumer financial product or service; or (C) the reasonable reliance
by the consumer on a covered person to act in the interests of the consumer. 47
To date, the Bureau has not issued a formal rule elaborating the standard(s) for
“abusive” conduct. Richard Cordray, the former Director of the CFPB, testified that,
“for us [the Bureau] to define what abusive means [through rulemaking] feels a little
presumptive, given that Congress defines what abusive means.” 48 Indeed, the definition of “abusive” adopted by Congress provides several meaningful insights into
the scope of its intended reach. First, “abusive” is intended to be a more flexible
standard than “unfair” or “deceptive,” affording regulators latitude to “address the
rapid changes in the consumer financial industry.” 49 Second, abusive conduct is subject to its own independent legal standard, indicating that practices that otherwise
43 Id. at VII-1.4.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at VII-1.3.
47 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (2012).
48 Richard Corday, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Statement before the Fin. Serv. Comm. of the U.S.
House of Representatives (Mar. 29, 2012) , https://www.c-span.org/video/?305214-1/consumer-fi-

nancial-protection-bureau-semiannual-report&start=2140.
49 Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse: The Dodd–Frank and Consumer Fin. Protection Act’s ‘‘Abusive’’
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satisfy the three-prong tests for unfairness and deception may still be prohibited under
the CFPA. Third, the abusive standard places more weight on subjective criteria; for
example, it does not include an objective cost-benefit analysis. Fourth, abusive conduct generally implicates power or information imbalances between the consumer
and the covered person. A covered person exploits this imbalance when he or she
“uses his or her superior understanding, power, or information to secure a transaction
with terms that are so unreasonable that they can be explained only by the consumer’s
lack of understanding, power or information.” 50
Some experts have posited that the addition of the abusive standard was meant
to address deficiencies in the FTCA, as practices that rise to the level of unfairness
or deception “present relatively extreme situations” that tend to limit prosecutions.51
For example, in the mortgage lending context, lenders have successfully argued that
certain transactions were “fair” because they represented a net tangible benefit to the
borrower, even if the terms of the mortgage raised long-term questions about the
borrower’s ability to repay it. 52 Similarly, the “deceptive” test is difficult to meet
because offending companies largely possess the industry data and documents necessary for consumers to establish they made a false or misleading statement. 53
The CFPB has defended its enforcement-centered approach in part by noting that
UDAAPs “can cause significant financial injury to consumers, erode consumer confidence, and undermine fair competition in the financial marketplace.” 54 The
CFPB’s enforcement record in this regard has been prolific. Since its inception in
2011, the Bureau has provided approximately $11.7 billion in consumer relief from
its supervisory and enforcement work and collected almost $440 million in civil penalties. 55 For example, in July 2015, Citibank agreed to pay almost $700 million in
consumer relief and $35 million in civil monetary penalties to the CFPB to settle
allegations of deceptive marketing practices and unfair billing practices related to
certain credit card add-on products and services. 56
Given the significant financial penalties at stake, 57 it comes as little surprise that

Standard, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 118, 120 (2011).
50 Eric Mogilnicki & Eamonn K. Moran, Understanding and Applying Dodd-Frank’s ‘Abusive’ Standard, 104 BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 161, at 2 (Jan. 27, 2015).
51 Testimony of John C. Dugan Comptroller of the Currency before the Comm. on the Fin. Serv. of the
U.S. House Representatives, 110th Cong. 34 (2007).
52 Lee, supra note 49, at 120.
53 Id.
54 CFPB, CFBP BULLETIN 13-07, PROHIBITION OF UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE, OR ABUSIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES IN THE COLLECTION OF CONSUMER DEBTS 1 (July 10, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201307_cfpb_bulletin_unfair-deceptive-abusive-practices.pdf.
55 CFPB FACTSHEET – ENFORCING FEDERAL CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 1–2 (2016), available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/07132016_cfpb_SEFL_anniversary_factsheet.pdf.
56 See Consent Order at 1, 36, 45 Citibank, N.A., 2015 CFPB 0015 (2015) (alleging, inter alia, “violations deceptive acts or practices relating to the marketing and sale of, and membership retention for, certain
Respondent credit card add-on products in violation of Sections 1031(a) and 1036(a)(1)(B) of the Consumer
Financial Protection Act of 2010 (CFPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), 5536(a)(1)(B)”).
57 See 12 U.S.C. § 5565 (2012) (providing that “[a]ny person that violates, through any act or omission,
any provision of Federal consumer financial law shall forfeit and pay a civil penalty . . .” up to $1 million per
day for “any person that knowingly violates a Federal consumer financial law.).
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the CFPB has faced backlash from supervised bank and nonbank entities for its aggressive approach to UDAAP enforcement. Supervised entities have recently challenged the Bureau’s stance in court, arguing that the terms embedded in UDAAP are
unconstitutionally vague because they fail to provide fair notice of allegedly prohibited conduct, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 58 Congress has also responded by proposing legislation that would effectively strip the Bureau of its UDAAP rulemaking and enforcement authority altogether. 59
II.

CHALLENGES TO THE CFPB’S UDAAP ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY
A. SELECTED JUDICIAL CHALLENGES
1. CFPB v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc.

In February 2014, the Bureau filed a groundbreaking lawsuit against for-profit
education giant ITT Educational Services, Inc. (“ITT”). ITT was a publicly-traded
for-profit secondary educational institution that previously operated 149 locations in
38 states. 60 The Bureau argued that ITT was a “covered person” under the CFPA
because it engaged in the provision of consumer financial products or services to
students—specifically, by “offering or providing loans, through certain private loan
programs, to its students to pay for a portion of ITT’s tuition.” 61
Students were ITT’s sole source of revenue. However, the average ITT student
has a poor credit history and low earnings; thus, he or she can rarely pay for ITT’s
substantial tuition out-of-pocket. 62 As a result, students relied heavily on government loans to finance their education. In 2012, about ninety-six percent of ITT’s
cash receipts came from the government—either in the form of Title IV aid programs, 63 or from federal benefits for service members and veterans and state aid programs. 64 Prior to 2008, ITT students relied on third-party lenders to finance the costs
of their education above those covered by loans or grants. However, in the wake of
the financial crisis, these sources largely dried up. As a result, ITT began offering its
students “Temporary Credits,” which were loans arranged by ITT that were payable
in a single lump sum payment at the end of the academic year. 65 ITT lent students
58 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that “no person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law). See also, e.g., Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 10, Consumer
Fin. Prot. Bureau v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:14-CV-00292-SEB, 2015 WL 1013508 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 28,
2014) (arguing that the terms “unfair” and “abusive,” both on their face and as applied, “failed to provide sufficient notice of what is proscribed and violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”).
59 See, e.g., H.R. 2612, 112 Cong. (2011) (amending the Dodd-Frank Act to repeal the Bureau’s authority to “(1) prohibit unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in connection with any transaction with a
consumer for, or the offering of, a consumer financial product or service; and (2) promulgate regulations to
prevent such practices.”).
60 Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages at 2, CFPB v. ITT Educ. Serv., Inc., No. 1:14-CV00292-SEB, 2015 WL 1013508 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2015).
61 Id. at 17.
62 See id. at 5 (noting that a two-year associate’s degree program at ITT costs approximately $44,000).
63 See Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 1070 (2012).
64 Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages at 25, CFPB v. ITT Educ. Serv., Inc., No. 1:14-CV00292-SEB, 2015 WL 1013508 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2015).
65 Id. at 6.
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approximately $100 million to $150 million per year in Temporary Credit from 2009
to 2011. 66 The Bureau alleged that ITT knew that the majority of its Temporary
Credit recipients would be unable to repay the lump sum payments within nine
months. 67 Nevertheless, ITT allegedly coerced students into incurring Temporary
Credit obligations but provided minimal disclosures about the terms of the program. 68 In addition, ITT staff allegedly mischaracterized the Credits as a source of
“funding” to cover costs above those covered by loans or grants and told students that
they did not need to be repaid. 69
ITT created two private loan programs in 2008 intended to serve as a vehicle for
students to pay off their Temporary Credit (the “Private Loan” programs). 70 Ostensibly, these programs were created: (1) to reduce the amount of Temporary Credit
outstanding; (2) convert the Credits into immediate income; and (3) help ITT avoid
lending students any further amounts from its own accounts after their first year. 71
However, these Private Loans carried high fees and high interest rates, had fewer
options to reduce monthly payments than federal loans, and were not dischargeable
in bankruptcy absent a special showing of undue hardship. 72
The Bureau alleged that ITT violated the CFPA’s prohibition against abusive
practices by taking “unreasonable advantage of ITT students’ inability to protect their
interests in selecting or using the ITT Private Loans.” 73 It cited ITT’s aggressive
tactics to coerce students into taking out the Private Loans, including the threat of
expulsion, as evidence of ITT’s intent to exploit its students’ financial vulnerabilities. 74 The Private Loan program was also characterized as abusive because it took
unreasonable advantage of ITT students’ reasonable reliance on ITT to act in their
interests. 75 ITT’s Financial Aid staff allegedly employed high pressure sales tactics
to push students into taking on high-risk loans they knew they could not repay in
order to improve the appearance of ITT’s financial statements and boost ITT’s stock
price. 76 ITT allegedly took advantage of students in other ways as well. Publicly,
ITT held itself out as an institution that could help students obtain more desirable
jobs and higher incomes. However, the Bureau alleged that ITT published misleading employment data that “did not represent realistic outcomes for most ITT students.” 77
Similarly, the Bureau charged that ITT’s Private Loan program practices were
unfair under the CFPA because they interfered with students’ ability to make informed, uncoerced choices. 78 As ITT students generally possessed limited financial
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id. at 112.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 105–07.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 114–15.
Id. at 123–28.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 160.
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means, they had no meaningful choice in deciding whether to select ITT’s Private
Loans to finance their education. Further, the Bureau noted that, “[g]iven the virtual
non-transferability of ITT credits, most students were forced to either take the ITT
Private Loans or forfeit their entire investment.” 79
ITT challenged the Bureau’s Complaint on several grounds. It disputed the Bureau’s characterization of its practices as unfair and abusive and argued that the CFPB
failed to provide sufficient notice of what conduct was proscribed by these terms. 80
As a result, ITT argued that the Bureau’s UDAAP claims under the CPFA should be
dismissed as unconstitutionally vague. 81 ITT further asserted that the CFPA’s mandate to prohibit unfair and abusive practices in the consumer finance industry was
unconstitutional because it amounted to sweeping, standardless delegation of legislative authority to the CFPB. 82
The U.S. Supreme Court previously addressed the “void for vagueness” doctrine
in the civil context involving another administrative agency, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”). In F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., the Court
noted that this doctrine:
addresses at least two connected but discrete due process concerns: [1]
Regulated parties should know what is required of them so they may act
accordingly; and [2] precision and guidance are necessary so that those
enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way. 83
As a general matter, the District Court in ITT, citing Fox, indicated that it would
“refuse to apply a statutory standard only where it is so amorphous that reasonable
observers have no choice but to ‘guess at its meaning[,] and differ as to its application.” 84 The court also clarified that the degree of vagueness tolerated by the Constitution, as well as “the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement,” depends in part on whether the statute imposes criminal or civil penalties, noting that
“less clarity is demanded of laws or regulations that are enforced through civil action
rather than prosecution.” 85 Further the court reasoned that, as the CFPA regulates
economic activity—as opposed to a protected constitutional interest like free expression—it is subject to a more lenient vagueness test. 86
The court held that the CFPA’s prohibition of “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” was not unconstitutionally vague, noting that these terms were largely adopted
79 Id. at 171.
80 See Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 10-12, CFPB v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No.
1:14-CV-00292-SEB, 2015 WL 1013508 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2015).
81 Id. at 11.
82 Id. at n.9 (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) in arguing that
“notions of ‘unfairness’ and ‘abusiveness’ also fail to lay down an ‘intelligible principle to which the [Bureau]
is directed to conform’”).
83 FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 240 (2012).
84 CFPB v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 878, 900 (citing Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269
U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
85 Id. at 900 (citing Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982)).
86 Id. at 902 (citing Illinois v. Alta Colleges, Inc., No. 14-C-3786, 2014 WL 4377579, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 4, 2014)).

70

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 45:3]

from the FTCA, the meaning of which “has been given concrete shape by successive
generations of interpretation and refinement.” 87 Thus, the court rejected ITT’s contention that “a reasonable business entity would be forced to guess at the term’s
meaning,[sic] or would be subject to [the] agency’s standardless discretion in its enforcement.” 88
The court also held that the CFPA’s use of the word “abusive” passed constitutional muster. The court’s reasoning turned on two existing federal statutes that addressed abusive practices in connection with debt collection and telemarketing practices, respectively. The first—The Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”)
—was enacted to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors”89
and includes a non-exhaustive list of exemplars of such abusive conduct. 90 The court
noted that the FDCPA had been on the books for nearly forty years and the FTC had
brought over sixty enforcement actions pursuant to this provision. 91 This extensive
enforcement record, in turn, “[enabled] the growth of an appreciable corpus of judicial commentary explicating the meaning of abusive treatment of consumers.” 92
Similarly, the court pointed to the Federal Telemarketing Sales Rule (“FTSR”),93
promulgated by the FTC pursuant to the Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention
Act, 94 as further evidence that defendants in ITT’s position had ample access to illustrative guidance on abusive practices. 95 The court concluded that the CFPA’s
clear prescriptive language regarding abusive conduct, combined with the use and
interpretation of this term in other related consumer protection statutes, provided “at
least the minimal level of clarity that the due process clause demands of non-criminal
economic regulation.” 96
2. CFPB v. Navient Corp.
More recently, the Bureau filed a Complaint against Navient Corporation and
two of its subsidiaries responsible for student loan servicing and collection. Navient
is the largest student loan servicer in the U.S. and services loans for over 12 million
borrowers, representing over $300 billion in federal and private student loans. 97 The
Bureau alleged that Navient’s practice of steering students experiencing financial
hardship into forbearance programs—rather than income-driven repayment plans—
was abusive. 98 The CFPB noted that forbearance programs, which permit eligible
borrowers to make reduced monthly payments or stop making payments on their
87 Id. at 903.
88 Id. at 904.
89 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012).
90 15 U.S.C. § 1692(d) (2012).
91 ITT, 219 F. Supp. 3d at 906.
92 Id.
93 16 C.F.R. § 310.4 (2015).
94 15 U.S.C. § 6102 (2012).
95 ITT, 219 F. Supp. 3d at 906.
96 Id.
97 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 2, CFPB v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-CV-101,
2017 WL 3380530 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017) (No. 3.17-CV-00101-RDM), 2017 WL 191446.
98 Id. at 50.
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loans for a defined period of time, are generally more suitable to borrowers experiencing temporary financial hardship or illness. 99 However, long-term enrollment in
forbearance programs often comes at a significant cost. For example, any unpaid
interest is generally added to the principal amount of the borrower’s loan, which can
greatly increase the borrower’s monthly payment over the repayment term. 100 By
contrast, income-based repayment plans afford several benefits to borrowers facing
prolonged financial hardship. As the title implies, these repayment programs are
generally tailored to the borrower’s income and family size, with some plans offering
starting payments of as little as $0 per month. 101 In addition, some of these plans
include interest subsidies, where the federal government essentially pays any unpaid
interest that accrues on the loan during the first three years of the repayment plan.102
This feature mitigates the risk of “payment shock” to the borrower that can occur
under a forbearance plan, where the unpaid interest is capitalized. Other incomedriven plans allow for forgiveness of the remaining principal balance of the loan after
the borrower makes a certain number of qualifying payments. 103
The Bureau further argued that Navient obtained an unreasonable benefit from
this practice at the borrowers’ expense because forbearance plans are generally more
efficient to administer and less costly than other repayment plans, which reduced
Navient’s operating costs. 104 Specifically, the CFPB noted that this practice took
unreasonable advantage of student’s reasonable reliance on Navient to help them select a repayment plan that was in their best interests. 105 In support of its position, the
Bureau pointed to numerous statements on Navient’s website indicating that Navient
was committed to helping borrowers find the repayment option that best fits their
budget. 106
In addition, the CFPB charged that Navient’s servicing practices were unfair under the CFPA. 107 The Bureau alleged that, over a period of several years, “Navient
steered hundreds of thousands of federal student loan borrowers experiencing longterm financial hardship into multiple consecutive forbearances that spanned
years.” 108 As a result, these borrowers suffered substantial injury in the form of significantly higher loan principal balances due to accumulated accrued interest. 109 Further, the Bureau reasoned that the injury was not reasonably avoidable because Navient furnished little or inadequate information regarding alternative repayment
plans; consequently, borrowers were unable to make informed decisions regarding
99 Id. at 34.
100 Id. at 34–35.
101 Id. at 30.
102 Id. at 31.
103 See id. at 32 (noting that certain public sector employees are entitled to principal forgiveness after
only ten years of qualifying payments).
104 Id. at 42–46.
105 Id. at 49.
106 See id. at 38–39 (quoting language from Navient’s website indicating that, “[w]e can help you find
an option that fits your budget, simplifies payment, and minimizes your total interest cost” but alleging that
Navient “routinely disregarded that commitment.”).
107 Id. at 144–47.
108 Id. at 144.
109 Id.
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the most appropriate plan for their financial situation. 110
The Bureau also characterized certain servicing and collection practices as deceptive. These included: (1) creating the false and misleading impression that providing incomplete or inaccurate renewal applications for certain loan repayment programs would only result in processing delays, without disclosing the possibility for
adverse financial implications; 111 and (2) representing that completing a “rehabilitation program” 112 would remove adverse information regarding the student loan from
the borrower’s credit report, but failing to disclose that the trade line reflecting late
payments and delinquencies prior to default would remain. 113
Similar to ITT, Navient brought a due process challenge to the CFPB’s UDAAP
enforcement authority and asserted that the Bureau “has never exercised its rulemaking power to ‘identify[] unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices under Federal
law,’ much less the specific conduct at issue here (emphasis supplied).” 114 Employing a nuanced textual and structural analysis, Navient argued that the text of the
Dodd-Frank Act constrained the Bureau’s ability to “declare” an act or practice to be
unlawful in absence of formal rulemaking. 115 Without this textual limitation, Navient argued that the CFPB could essentially bring an enforcement suit against a covered entity and argue that unfairness and abusiveness mean whatever the Bureau
wants it to mean. 116
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied
Navient’s Motion to Dismiss in its entirety on August 4, 2017. 117 The court reframed Navient’s due process challenge and stated that the relevant inquiry was not
whether Navient had fair notice of the Bureau’s interpretation of the CFPA, but rather whether it had fair notice of what the Act requires. 118 Here, the court drew
parallels with another Third Circuit case, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.119 In
Wyndham, the FTC alleged that the defendants’ deficient cybersecurity measures
failed to protect consumer data against hackers and constituted an “unfair” practice
under the FTC Act. 120 Similar to Navient, Wyndham charged that the FTC had failed
to promulgate a relevant rule or adjudication on the matter of unfairness, and thus the
FTC Act, “as applied” to its cybersecurity practices, failed on due process

110 Id. at 145.
111 Id. at 155–56.
112 See id. at 117 (explaining that these programs allowed federal student loan borrowers whose loans
were in default status to restore their loans to active repayment status if they successfully made nine consecutive
on-time payments over the course of ten months).
113 Id. at 119–20.
114 Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 13–14, CFPB v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-CV101, 2017 WL 3380530 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017).
115 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2012) (“The Bureau shall have no authority under this Section to declare
an act or practice abusive with the provision of a consumer financial product or service, unless the act or practice.” (emphasis added)).
116 CFPB v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-CV-00101-RDM, 2017 WL 3380530, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18,
2017).
117 See id.
118 Id. at *8.
119 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
120 Id.
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grounds. 121 In absence of an FTC rule or adjudication that merited agency deference,
the FTC in Wyndham relied on “ordinary judicial interpretation of a civil statute” to
interpret the FTC Act “in the first instance” and decide whether it prohibited the alleged conduct. 122 The District Court in Navient, citing the Third Circuit’s decision
in Wyndham, held that Navient’s fair notice argument failed as a matter of law and
clarified that “[f]air notice is satisfied . . . as long as the company can reasonably
foresee that a court could construe its conduct as falling within the meaning of the
statute.” 123
B. RECENT LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGES
Almost immediately after the Bureau “went live” in July 2011, it faced legislative challenges that threatened to clip the wings of its enforcement powers. For example, H.R. 2612, sponsored by Florida Rep. Connie Mack IV (R-FL), sought to
repeal the CFPB’s ability to promulgate regulations relating to UDAAPs and prohibit
the Bureau from bringing enforcement actions to prohibit the same. 124 Although this
rather targeted bill failed to emerge from committee hearings, a more comprehensive
proposal to overhaul the CFPB has gained more traction as of late. The Financial
CHOICE (“Creating Hope and Opportunity for Investors, Consumers, and Entrepreneurs”) Act of 2016, 125 introduced by House Financial Services Committee Chair
Rep. Jeb Hensarling (R-TX), spanned over five hundred pages in length and contained a series of proposed changes to the Bureau’s structure and functions. While a
comprehensive discussion of the CHOICE Act is beyond the scope of this Note, the
Act was broadly designed to provide regulatory relief from certain Dodd-Frank requirements to bank and nonbank financial institutions. 126 For starters, the Act effectively proposed to “re-brand” the CFPB as the “Consumer Financial Opportunity
Commission” (“CFOC”). 127 But the list of its “amendments” to Dodd-Frank went
far beyond mere cosmetic changes. Indeed, the corresponding changes to the Bureau’s mandate provide instructive cues as to the anti-consumer, pro-industry sentiment that permeates much the rest of the Bill. 128 Some sections reflect an inherent
distrust of the Bureau’s perceived power, particularly amidst charges that it is an un-

121 Id. at 253–54.
122 Id.
123 CFPB v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-CV-00101-RDM, 2017 WL 3380530, at *8-9 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18,
2017) (citing FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 256 (3d Cir. 2015)).
124 H.R. 2612, 112th Cong. (2011).
125 Financial CHOICE Act of 2016, H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. (2016).
126 See SEAN M. HOSKINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44631, THE FINANCIAL CHOICE ACT IN THE 114TH
CONGRESS: POLICY ISSUES 2–12 (2016).
127 Financial CHOICE Act of 2016, H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. § 311 (2016).
128 Compare 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2012) (“The Bureau shall seek to implement and, where applicable,
enforce Federal consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access
to markets for consumer financial products and that markets for consumer financial products and services are
fair, transparent, and competitive.”) with Financial CHOICE Act of 2016, H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. § 316 (2016)
(modifying the Bureau’s mandate in enforcing Federal consumer financial law to be “for the purpose of
strengthening participation in markets by covered persons, without Government interference or subsidies, to
increase competition, and enhance consumer choice.”).
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constitutional entity insulated from any meaningful checks by the Executive or Legislative branches. 129 To that end, H.R. 5983 proposed to replace the single-Director
structure of the CFPB with a multimember commission, similar to the current leadership of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”). 130 This version of the CHOICE Act also repealed
the Bureau’s ability to prohibit abusive practices, although consumers would still retain limited protections against UDAPs perpetuated by covered entities. 131
In the spring of 2017, House Republicans announced plans to introduce an updated version of the bill, dubbed the CHOICE Act “2.0,” that promised to build on
existing attempts to amend, repeal, or replace key Dodd-Frank provisions. 132 Similar
to its predecessor, the new bill proposed another facelift to the Bureau’s name.133
But whereas CHOICE “1.0” at least tacitly acknowledged the important supervisory
role the Bureau plays over bank and nonbank institutions, its progeny proposed to
dismantle the Bureau’s supervisory and examination functions altogether. 134 Among
other shortcomings, this feature would severely limit the Bureau’s ability to prospectively limit potential harm to consumers—for example, by identifying compliance
issues found in the course of routine examinations. 135 Significantly, the rebranded
CLEA would also lose all of its UDAAP rulemaking and enforcement capabilities
under CHOICE 2.0. While the bill passed the House in June, largely along party
lines, its ultimate fate remains unclear. Some industry commentators have posited
that elements of the comprehensive bill will be partitioned and considered separately,
or that Senate Republicans will need to come up with their own version of the
CHOICE Act, with at least some bipartisan support. 136 Apparently lost among partisan attempts by Republican lawmakers to mischaracterize the Bureau as an omnipotent bureaucracy are headline-grabbing statistics reminding all Americans of the
significant rights the Bureau has vindicated on their behalf. For example, according
to data published by the Bureau, the CFPB brought over 125 enforcement actions that
utilized UDAAP through July 2017 (roughly sixty-five percent of total enforcement
actions). 137 As a result, over 26.3 million consumers have been entitled to over $10.8
billion in consumer relief through monetary redress, debt cancellation, or principal
reduction. 138 Regardless of the perceived shortcomings of the Dodd-Frank Act more
129 See, e.g., Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 8–10, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v.
ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:14-CV-00292-SEB, 2015 WL 1013508 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 28, 2014) (arguing, inter
alia, that the Bureau’s structure, which is led by a single Director who may only be removed for cause, violates
the Constitution’s separation of powers).
130 Id. at 19–22.
131 Financial CHOICE Act of 2016, H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. (2016).
132 Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017).
133 See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 711 (2017) (converting the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) into the Consumer Law Enforcement Agency).
134 Marc Labonte et al., Cong. Research Serv., R44839, THE FINANCIAL CHOICE ACT IN THE 115TH
CONGRESS: SELECTED POLICY ISSUES 28–30 (2017).
135 Id. at 25.
136 Brena Swanson, Is the Financial Choice Act DOA in the Senate?, HOUSINGWIRE (June 9, 2017),
https://www.housingwire.com/articles/40390-is-the-financial-choice-act-doa-in-the-senate.
137 Staff of H. Comm. on Fin. Serv’s., 115th Cong., THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU
IN PERSPECTIVE 17–19 (July 21, 2017).
138 Id.
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generally, it would seem antithetical to the legislative process to paint over the Bureau’s short, impressive history with such broad brush strokes.
III.
THE CASE FOR UPHOLDING THE CFPB’S APPROACH TO UDAAP ENFORCEMENT

A.

THE BUREAU HAS ISSUED SUBSTANTIVE GUIDANCE ON UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE, AND ABUSIVE PRACTICES THROUGH COMPLIANCE BULLETINS

The CFPB has published a series of bulletins that provide additional guidance
for regulated entities seeking to understand the contours of the Bureau’s UDAAP
enforcement authority. These publications touch on a variety of topics, including:
(1) consumer debt collection; (2) credit reporting; (3) consumer credit cards; and (4)
pay-by-phone services.
1. CFPB Bulletin 2013-07: Prohibition of Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or
Practices in the Collection of Consumer Debts
In July 2013, the Bureau published guidance on consumer debt collection practices. The Bulletin stated that conduct which contravenes the FDCPA could also
constitute a UDAAP prohibited by the Dodd-Frank Act. 139 While the FDCPA generally only applies to third-party debt collectors and debt purchasers, the Bureau clarified that all “[o]riginal creditors and other covered persons and service providers
under the Dodd-Frank Act involved in collecting debt related to any consumer financial product or service are subject to the prohibition against UDAAPs in the DoddFrank Act.” 140 The Bureau also created a non-exhaustive list of ten practices or patterns of conduct related to the collection of consumer debts that could constitute
UDAAPs. 141

2. CFPB Bulletin 2013-08: Representations Regarding Effect of Debt

Pay-

ments on Credit Reports and Scores
The CFPB published a second contemporaneous Bulletin in July 2013 detailing
additional guidance applicable to creditors, debt buyers, and third-party debt collectors. 142 The Bureau expressed concern over representations made by these entities
regarding the relationship between paying debts in collection and a consumer’s credit
report. 143 It cited observations gleaned from its recent supervisory investigations and
enforcement investigations indicating that certain debt owners and debt collectors
were engaging in a pattern of material misrepresentations, including: (1) representing
139 CFBP BULLETIN 13-07, PROHIBITION OF UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE, OR ABUSIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES IN
COLLECTION OF CONSUMER DEBTS 1 (July 10, 2013), available at https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201307_cfpb_bulletin_unfair-deceptive-abusive-practices.pdf.
140 Id. at 5.
141 Id. at 5–6.
142 CFBP BULLETIN 13-08, REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING EFFECT OF DEBT PAYMENTS ON CREDIT
REPORTS AND SCORES (July 10, 2013).
143 Id. at 1–2.
THE
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that payments on certain “obsolete debts” would remove negative information about
the debt from the consumer’s credit report, even though the information would likely
not have appeared on the credit report had the debt remained unpaid; (2) representing
that payments on debts in collection would improve the borrower’s credit score, when
in reality an individual’s credit score is influenced by numerous factors; and (3) representing that paying debts in collection would improve the borrower’s creditworthiness or likelihood of subsequently receiving credit from a lender, even though lenders
often assign differing weights to information used to evaluate a borrower’s creditworthiness, including credit report or credit score information. 144
The CFPB took the position that these misrepresentations, which would likely
be illegal under the FDCPA, 145 may also constitute a deceptive practice under the
Dodd-Frank Act. 146 The Bureau put debt collectors on notice that it would review
their internal policies and procedures in the course of its supervision activities or
enforcement investigations to assess whether they are “making these types of claims
and the factual basis for them.” 147
3. CFPB Bulletin 2014-02: Marketing of Credit Card Promotional APR Offers
In September 2014, the Bureau issued a Bulletin addressing advertising practices
in connection with certain credit card promotional offers. 148 The Bulletin cautioned
credit card issuers that certain solicitations offering a promotional annual percentage
rate (“APR”) on particular transactions over a defined period of time may constitute
a deceptive and/or abusive act or practice under the CFPA. 149 The Bureau cited promotions offering consumers the ability to transfer their credit card balance at a low
or zero percent APR as an area of particular concern. In some instances, consumers
may benefit from these promotions by paying off higher APR credit cards or tapping
into cheaper sources of credit to finance a large purchase over a period of time. 150
However, these potential benefits often come with conditions—namely, a transaction
fee for accepting the offer, and a requirement that the consumer pay the full statement
balance on the credit card by the payment due date. 151 If the consumer fails to pay
the statement balance in full—including the amount subject to the promotional
APR—he or she will lose the benefit of the “grace period” typically afforded to interest charges. 152

144 Id. at 2–3.
145 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012) (declaring it unlawful for a debt collector to “use any false, deceptive,
or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.”).
146 CFBP BULLETIN 13-08, REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING EFFECT OF DEBT PAYMENTS ON CREDIT
REPORTS AND SCORES (July 10, 2013).
147 Id. at 3.
148 CFBP BULLETIN 14-02, MARKETING OF CREDIT CARD PROMOTIONAL APR OFFERS (Sept. 3, 2014).
149 Id.
150 Id. at 2.
151 Id.
152 The “grace period” refers a period of time after the close of a cardholder’s billing cycle where she
will not incur interest charges on purchases made during the billing cycle provided she pays the full balance by
the payment due date.
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The Bureau found that some card issuers conveyed the misimpression to consumers that the only cost of obtaining the low promotional APR was the transaction
fee for accepting the offer. In addition, they did not prominently disclose the fact
that consumers may incur additional interest charges on later purchases if they do not
pay their balances in full (and thus restore the “grace period” for incurring these
charges). 153 Further, they failed to cure these misimpressions. 154 The Bureau concluded that this misrepresentation would be material from the standpoint of the “reasonable consumer” because it pertains to a central characteristic of the product (its
cost). 155 Thus, it could constitute a deceptive advertising practice under the CFPA.
In addition, the Bulletin clarified the conditions under which these practices could be
deemed abusive. 156
4. CFPB Bulletin 2017-01: Phone Pay Fees
More recently, the Bureau addressed the potential for UDAAP violations in assessing fees for pay-by-phone services employed by certain financial services providers. 157 These entities may charge different phone pay fees depending on the payment method selected by the consumer. 158 However, in some instances, the CFPB
found that these entities or their third-party service providers failed to disclose these
fees or failed to inform consumers of the material price difference between available
phone payment options. 159 In another case, the Bureau described a service provider
that engaged in the deceptive practice of giving delinquent credit card holders the
false impression that their sole payment choice was a $14.95 pay-by-phone option
when there were other no-cost payment alternatives available. 160 The CFPB also
indicated that “production incentives” or other incentive-based programs employed
by some providers may increase the risk of these entities engaging in UDAAPs.161
In particular, they noted that these programs, which often reward employees based
on their ability to steer consumers into higher-cost payment options, create a risk that
consumers will be inadequately informed about the availability of lower-cost alternatives. 162
B. THE BUREAU’S RECENT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE
PLAIN STATUTORY MANDATE OF THE CFPA AND ARE NARROWLY TAILORED

153 CFBP Bulletin 14-02, Marketing of Credit Card Promotional APR OFFERS 2–3 (Sept. 3, 2014).
154 Id. at 2.
155 Id. at 3.
156 See id. at 3–4 (indicating that, “[d]epending on all of the facts and circumstances, an issuer may take
unreasonable advantage of such consumers by failing to adequately inform them of these conditions and by
exploiting their lack of understanding to impose additional costs.”).
157 CFBP Bulletin 17-01, Phone Pay FEES (July 31, 2017).
158 Id. at 2.
159 Id. at 1–2.
160 Id. at 3 (citing Citibank, N.A., No. 2015-CFPB-0015 (CFPB, July 21, 2015)).
161 Id. at 5.
162 Id.
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TO ROOTING OUT ONLY THE MOST EGREGIOUS CASES OF UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE,
OR ABUSIVE CONDUCT

In addition to the cases discussed in Part II, supra, the Bureau has promulgated
extensive guidance to covered entities in the form of enforcement actions, which illustrate a consistent approach to applying UDAAP standards. In particular, these
matters reflect a tailored approach by the CFPB that targets particularly egregious
conduct in the financial marketplace and does not represent an abuse of the agency’s
own discretion.
For example, in December 2014, the Bureau took firm action against two student
debt relief scams that reaped millions of dollars of illegal fees from student borrowers
and made false representations regarding their services and affiliations. 163 One entity—doing business as College Education Services (“CES”)—was even banned
from participating in the debt relief business altogether. The Bureau alleged that CES
engaged in deceptive advertising practices by materially misrepresenting that their
“debt relief” services would result in lower monthly payments for student loan borrowers and failed to deliver on these promises. 164 In addition, the CFPB charged that
CES’ “loan counselors” engaged in abusive practices by taking unreasonable advantage of financially distressed consumers and failing to act in their best interests—
often by steering them into costly loan consolidation programs rather than offering
them individualized advice. 165 The other entity operated under the fictitious name,
“Student Loan Processing.US” and falsely implied to consumers that it was affiliated
with the U.S. Department of Education. 166 The CFPB charged that this was a material misrepresentation in violation of the CFPA’s prohibition of deceptive practices. 167
In May 2015, the popular online payment system PayPal entered into a consent
decree with the Bureau in stemming from allegations relating to its online credit product, PayPal Credit. 168 The CFPB alleged that PayPal engaged in deceptive advertising practices by failing to honor advertised promotions, such as credits toward consumer purchases. More strikingly, the Bureau uncovered evidence indicating that
PayPal enrolled consumers in PayPal Credit automatically and without their consent−often when signing up for a regular PayPal account or making purchases. This
was appropriately deemed to be an unfair practice under the CFPA as it was (1)
clearly not reasonably avoidable by consumers and (2) was likely to cause substantial
injury, as consumers may fail to make payments or incur late fees and interest on
accounts that they do not know exists.
163 Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Takes Action to End Student “Debt Relief” Scams (Dec. 11, 2014),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-to-end-student-debt-relief-scams/.
164 Complaint for Permanent Injunction, Civil Money Penalties, and Other Relief at 14, CFPB v. College
Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 8:14CV3078T36EAJ, (M.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2014).
165 Id. at 14–16.
166 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 8-9, CFPB v. IrvineWebWorks, No. 8:14CV-1967, (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2014).
167 Id. at 15–16.
168 Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Takes Action Against PayPal for Illegally Signing up Consumers for
Unwanted Online Credit (May 19, 2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takesaction-against-paypal-for-illegally-signing-up-consumers-for-unwanted-online-credit/.
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In perhaps the most shocking illustration of the need for the CFPB’s UDAAP
enforcement in recent memory, the Bureau in 2016 fined retail banking giant Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. $100 million for its highly-publicized practice of opening unauthorized deposit and credit card accounts without consumer authorization. 169 The
CFPB’s analysis indicated that Wells Fargo employees opened over 1.5 million unauthorized deposit accounts, often through “simulated funding,” whereby funds from
consumers’ existing accounts were transferred to the unauthorized account. 170 These
actions clearly contravened the CFPA’s prohibition of abusive practices as (1) consumers could not protect their own interest in avoiding account fees or other charges
as they did not have an opportunity to offer affirmative assent to these unauthorized
account agreements; and (2) consumers were not afforded an opportunity to be apprised of the terms or conditions of these accounts.
While each of these enforcement actions implicates a different set of facts, a
consistent pattern emerges. Namely, to date the Bureau has applied its UDAAP enforcement authority to a narrow range of conduct that: (1) is clearly proscribed by the
plain meaning of the terms “unfair,” “deceptive,” and “abusive,” as set forth in the
CFPA; (2) is appropriately tailored to more extreme cases of consumer abuse, harassment, and exploitation as opposed to conduct that is “at the margins” of propriety;
and (3) does not present meaningful due process concerns to responsible financial
services providers.
CONCLUSION
Nearly every federal agency tasked with some form of oversight or enforcement
authority operates within a sphere of compromise. For the CFPB, this compromise
may be framed as a desire to facilitate consumer choice in a market economy while
making it incumbent on financial providers to ensure that consumers have the information to make these choices responsibly. Providing access to consumer credit from
responsible financial services providers is undoubtedly important, and that is particularly true for unbanked and underbanked Americans, who often possess limited financial or educational means. 171 Although the Bureau was vested with significant
statutory authority to administer and enforce federal consumer laws, its short history
illustrates that it has channeled this power responsibly in order to tackle particularly
egregious practices that often targeted the most vulnerable members of society. Prohibiting UDAAPs in the consumer financial marketplace may be used both as a sword
and a shield that will help restore confidence in a system that drew much deserved
ire from the American public in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
Perhaps the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s 2009 proposal outlining its vision
169 Press Release, CFPB, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Fines Wells Fargo $100 Million for
Widespread Illegal Practice of Secretly Opening Unauthorized Accounts (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-fines-wells-fargo-100-million-widespread-illegal-practice-secretly-opening-unauthorized-accounts/.
170 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2016-CFPB-0015 (CFPB, July 21, 2015).
171 See, e.g. FDIC, 2015 NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 1–2 (Oct.
20, 2016) (indicating that seven percent of U.S. households were unbanked in 2015, representing approximately
9 million households, and an additional almost twenty percent of U.S. households were underbanked, representing 24.5 million households).
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for the CFPB best articulates this sentiment:
Consumer protection is a critical foundation for our financial system. It
gives the public confidence that financial markets are fair and enables policy makers and regulators to maintain stability in regulation. Stable regulation, in turn, promotes growth, efficiency, and innovation over the long
term.
. . . To instill a genuine culture of consumer protection and not merely of
legal compliance in our financial institutions, we need first to instill that
culture in the federal regulatory structure. 172

172 Dep’t. of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform – A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial
Supervision and Regulation 56 (June 17, 2009), available at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/20096171052487309.aspx.

